Remapping Our Political Terrain: An Inventory of Pessimism, Circa 2024

I started really reading substack about a month or so ago, and it has quickly colonized much of my time. The fact that it is essentially wordpress combined with twitter—a blog with social media built in—means that it’s easy to find new blogs, and it’s easy to spend hours reading them.

Much of substack, at least the section of substack the algorithm has shunted me onto, is obsessed with politics: political reporting, political commentary, and political development. The more I read, though, the less clarity on political matters I seem to have.

Part of this may be generational: I’m an old millennial; I turned 18 in 2000. The 1990’s were the decade of The End of History, that time when liberal democracy seemed not ascendant, but already utterly victorious and hegemonic. This was before 9/11, before the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, before Obama—before Trump. It was, in many ways, a very different world.

My understanding of politics in my late teens was pretty basic: you had the Republicans, who were conservative on both economic and cultural issues, and you had the Democrats, who were liberal or progressive on both economic and cultural issues. Of course, this understanding was faulty. My understanding of the Republicans was more or less correct, but the Democrats had not really been much of a liberal or progressive party, especially on economic issues, for a while at that point. The big realignment of the parties in 1964/1968 had left a Democratic Party that maybe really was truly left-leaning on economics and social issues, but that version of the party died pretty quickly. Jimmy Carter’s failed campaign in 1980 was both perhaps its apotheosis and its grave.

Bill Clinton’s victory in 1992 was the victory of the “Third Way” of Democratic politics; in other words, it was the victory of neoliberal economic policy with a “wait-and-see” attitude on many cultural and social issues. Despite its name, neoliberalism was (and is!) really a retrenchment of market-friendly economic policies. That is: neoliberalism is really just a new face for conservative economic policy. So: certainly by the 90’s, the Democrats were really a sort of center-conservative party, while the Republicans were a more staunchly and truly conservative party. In a two-party system, this meant that electoral options for voters were narrow indeed.

Unsurprisingly, this situation didn’t last. Pressure continued to mount for progressive cultural and social change from feminist, queer, black, indigenous, critics, just to name some of the most prominent. The Democratic Party came to see that differentiating themselves on social and cultural issues, such as gay marriage and abortion, was a winning strategy at the voting booth—though it’s worth noting that the party followed the lead of others on e.g. gay marriage, and did not lead itself. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were both officially opposed to gay marriage, for example, until the polling showed that a near super-majority of Americans were in favor.

But as the party moved leftward on cultural and social issues—a trend that intensified in the 2010’s—it continued to hold a firm line on neoliberal economic questions. The Obama administration’s response to the Great Recession in 2009 and following is a great example; more than a trillion dollars was allocated to shore up failed corporations, yet millions of Americans lost their homes as the value of real estate plummeted (but the terms of mortgages remained unchanged).

It was into this context that Donald Trump erupted in 2015. Most Americans—of both parties—were sick of neoliberal economic policies (even if they didn’t use that term to describe them). A growing segment of Americans were also increasingly concerned with the advance of liberal and progressive cultural values: while gay marriage rapidly gained supermajority support, questions around transgender identity and rights, as well as questions as to how to address racial inequality, would prove more controversial.

Trump knew how to stoke concern and resentment on both fronts. He presented himself as a populist on economic issues—promising a return of manufacturing jobs, for example—while also doubling down on traditional Republican views of liberal culture, describing black protestors as thugs and deriding trans people.

Trump’s position—and his brash, politically neophyte way of campaigning—meant that most people in power didn’t take his presidential campaign seriously. And then, he won the Republican primary—and not by a narrow margin, but a massive one. His brand of politics (and, presumably, his personality) were exactly what Republican voters were looking for.

It’s hard to say whether Trump is best understood as a cause or as an effect of what has happened to our politics since. Either way, Trump’s presence has only intensified the strange realignment of the parties. The Republicans remain staunchly—even reactionarily—conservative on cultural and social issues, while presenting themselves as populist on economic ones. (The fact that they rarely, if ever, actually work to enact legislation or policy to help the working class, seems to have had little impact on most voters.)

Meanwhile, the Democrats have shifted more and more attention to their liberal and progressive cultural stance, while solidifying a quiet but unapologetic deference to neoliberal economic policy. This was clearly on display in both 2016 and 2020; Bernie Sanders campaigned on an economically left-wing position, but famously presented a more muted stance on social and cultural issues (his ambivalence towards gun control was especially commented-upon in 2016). Clinton did just the opposite, and though Sanders garnered serious support, the culturally progressive but economically conservative position won the primary. Of course, it lost the election (though to be fair to Clinton, she did win the popular vote—a noteworthy if, ultimately, irrelevant caveat.)

So this is what our political landscape looks like today: we can choose a cultural reactionary who pretends to care about working-class people (but who will do nothing to actually help them), or a cultural progressive who is pretty frank about refusing to do anything to help working-class people. (It is worth noting that the Biden administration actually did do some minor, though significant, things to support working-class interests, including supporting unions during strikes. However, his administration has also made a point of downplaying these actions, especially in the case of the FTC’s struggle with tech monopolies. Even when the Democrats do something for working people, they seem to know they need to hide it, lest they spook some of their large donors.)

This situation is sad enough as it is, but it gets worse. Again, I’m an old millennial, and so I had long taken it for granted that the progressive/liberal cultural position was only going to grow in strength as time went by—young people, after all, are almost always more culturally permissive than their elders. But there is growing evidence that this just isn’t the case. Gen Z men, in particular, seem to have taken a sharp conservative turn, at least on some specific cultural and social questions. Of course, this is a generalization, and there are plenty of liberally-minded Gen Z men. But if the victory for gay marriage had seemed to usher in a 2nd sort of “end of history” moment, in which cultural progressivism marched inevitably into victory, that has now been revealed as an illusion. This also means, of course, that if the Democratic Party has built its strategy by tacking left on culture and remaining center on economics, they may discover they made a big mistake.

Now, it must be said that the set of “options” that I outlined above was electorally accurate, but of course the opinions held by voters were more various. In truth, we could probably identify four basic political groupings in the late 90’s and into the 2000’s: you had Republican loyalists (conservative on economics and society), Democratic loyalists (less conservative on both, especially social issues), libertarians (conservative on economic issues, but generally rather liberal on many, though not all, social issues), and a large and diverse group of leftists we can generalize as socialists (leftist on economic issues and quiet liberal on social issues). Even these groupings mask disagreements, of course. But I think this gives us a reasonably accurate, if still imprecise, understanding of American politics 20 years ago.

These 4 basic groupings still describe a decent number of people, but the new political landscape is full of contradictions—or, at least, confusions. Old assumptions about what suite of political positions one would hold are fast fraying. Plenty of substack writers will hold, for example, downright reactionary views on feminism, race, and LGBTQ rights, while also condemning US foreign policy as too aggressive, and wanting a protectionist economic regime. Using the four labels above, how would we characterize such a person? Conservative on culture, isolationist on foreign policy, and populist on economics. They just don’t fit into any of the old categories at all. Now, such a person is very likely to support Donald Trump, and the other politicians who are swimming in his wake (J.D. Vance, obviously, but also Matt Gaetz, Marjory Taylor Greene, and others), so perhaps that is the only category we can assign them to. Does this make them standard-issue Republicans? I’m not really sure; it seems there still is a significant, if often quiet, segment of the Republicans that are pining for a return of the old form of their party. Hence we get people talking about the “alt-right”, and while I do think that term is helpful, it’s not always quite clear who it does or doesn’t describe

I think the rise of this new Trumpist/alt-right position says a lot about the direction that US politics will take in the next 20 years. What has changed, though, such that this new intersection of concerns is a growing demographic? Isolationist views are not new, and have long had a place in the Republican party (even if they were always a marginalized minority). Likewise, paeans to the working-class are nearly as old as the republic, and have been common in both parties. I think it’s the new energy against progressive cultural and social issues that is the main animating force behind this new political position.

Of course, conservative and reactionary attitudes towards cultural and social change are not new. After all, women didn’t even gain the right to vote until 1920, and that took decades of activism. Likewise, the right to marry someone of the same sex/gender was only enshrined at the federal level in 2015, and was—and is—bitterly opposed by many. Civil Rights legislation, first proposed in the 1860’s, didn’t pass until a century later. (Indeed, opposition to genuine racial justice in this country is older than our constitution, and continues with extreme vigor.)

Even so, I think there is a new alt-right mode of conservative cultural politics at hand today. In many ways, the success of this new conservatism is in part due to the failure of the old conservatism, (as well as over-reach on the part of cultural progressives, as I will suggest below). Although there hyper-reactionary conservatives who just want to roll back most or all of the cultural and social changes of the 20th century—one gets the suspicion that J.D. Vance, after all, seems to think that perhaps women shouldn’t vote—the newer, younger conservatives seem to have a narrower focus. I think most of these figures take some of the cultural changes of the last few decades for granted: they generally aren’t opposing gay marriage or women’s role in the economy, but they do oppose trans rights, they seem Black Lives Matter as a threat to social order, and in general they are tired of progressive identity politics (while, of course, simply instantiating their own brand of regressive identity politics).

Now it could be that the fault lines in this new conservatism are simply due to a tactical retreat—after all—women working, even in high-powered positions—and gay marriage are both pretty popular among the electorate, and they are also both realities that have been stitched deeply into society (though as mentioned above and addressed below, debate around women’s rights continues in various ways). In truth, there is no easy way to undo these changes without wreaking havoc on society and the law. Meanwhile, questions around things like reparations for slavery or the status of trans people are still unresolved and much more controversial. Perhaps the new conservatives have admitted defeat on the former issues just so they can focus their energy on the front that they might still win.

I think there is more going on here, though. In large part, many Americans see women’s rights and gay rights as inoffensive—so long as those rights are understood in a limited way. Women wanting to work, for example, seems to many like an issue of basic fairness. If a woman can do a given job, why shouldn’t she be able to, well, do it? Likewise, for most straight people, gay marriage is neither a problem nor a threat: if gay men want to marry men, and lesbians want to marry other women, why should that bother anyone else? Many Americans agree, I think, with the sentiment that “no one should care what other consenting adults do behind closed doors.”

However, the questions which have been central to progressive cultural and social movements more lately have a different character. The movement for reparations for descendants of enslaved people, for example, would presumably involve the transfer of at least many billions of dollars from or through the federal government. That’s a lot of money, and many white people balk at the idea: two men getting married doesn’t cost us anything; but reparations sure seems like it would. Likewise, discussions of trans rights raise a host of thorny questions. Not only are many people concerned about the potential presence of male-bodied people in women’s restrooms, but the difficulties are more fundamental: accepting that transwomen are women would entail a change to most people’s understanding of what the word “woman” means, exactly. Obviously, for many (cis)women, that might feel uncomfortable. But also for straight men, it raises personal, fraught, even embarrassing questions.

In other words, the new lines of culture war would seem to have more at stake, even for people who are generally liberal or simply apathetic to such debates. The momentum towards gay marriage proved inevitable, in part, because most people had nothing to lose by its victory, even while a small but significant minority had much to gain. But the new proposed changes are different: many Americans perceive a threat in the air.

Whether they are right to perceive a threat from the “new” identity politics (of course neither the call for trans rights or for reparations,  the two examples I use here, are new at all—but their place in the limelight of American politics and culture is) is a deeper question, and one on which I imagine many people will disagree. But that many Americans perceive a threat here is, I think, pretty much beyond debate. And I suggest this perception is powering a new realignment in political activity.

Whither this new realignment may take us, I won’t pretend to say. It has been interesting—and very sad, in my opinion—to see how the push for genuine economic change reached a real crescendo around 2016—and then quickly crested and collapsed. No one, it seems, is talking any more about Medicare for All. The ultimate failure of both the Sanders and Corbyn campaigns, in the US and UK respectively, does signal the end of real opportunity to see real economic progress for working people of all races, ethnicities, and genders. The recent maneuvering by Emmanuel Macron in France to deny the right of the victorious left-wing alliance to form a government there is another signal that such a movement is likely dead-on-arrival.

What we are left with, then, are two options, each of which seem profoundly disappointing, each in their own way (although they also show quite an overlap of disappointing positions too!) It seems to me that American politics in 2024 is a reminder of the impotence of political action to really fundamentally fix the problems before us. Politics certainly changes things, of course, and it can even make good changes. But over and over, we see that the old problems reassert themselves in new ways. Slavery is defeated, only to be replaced by segregation, lynching, and share-cropping. Of course, this nexus of repression wasn’t as bad as slavery—and that difference matters! Still, it’s hard to see how this process of slow changes through more sophisticated forms of labor discipline ends at a truly just society. This lesson seems even more brutally taught in, for example, the failure of the Arab Spring, or the reactionary turn of politics in Israel. It seems that so often, genuine efforts to right the wrongs of the past just create new wrongs in the present—which someone will try to solve in the future with, at best, extremely limited success.

Of course, this recognition of the failure of liberalizing movements is often invoked to justify conservatism along Burkean lines. And while I am certainly feeling pessimistic, I certainly don’t think any of this means we should be opposed to or even apathetic to a politics of (good) change. I do think it should remind us though, that ultimately, our hope for justice and righteousness can’t rest on political economy. Although I am sympathetic to the long trajectory of the Social Gospel and its heirs, I think it was both theologically and politically bankrupt, promising far more than it could ever deliver and fundamentally misunderstanding the reality of sin. The world is far more broken than secular political analysis, whether liberal, or Marxian, is able to recognize.

To put it simply, I think that genuine Christian theology teaches us that history is a political problem—but without a political solution. But I’ll have more to say on that another day.

Division Among the Democrats: Tactics Vs. Strategy

demDonkeyAt this point there is surely no shortage of articles and blog posts written by Clinton- and Sanders-supporters this primary season. Most of you have probably seen your Facebook feeds and RSS feeds (are those still a thing?) fill up with such pieces. I myself have posted many to Facebook. The problem that a lot of people have identified in this debate is that, as is always almost the case in political debates, the two sides are largely talking past, or at, each other, rather than engaging in a real discourse with each other. I won’t pretend to have avoided this pitfall myself, but this problem has gotten me thinking, and I’d like to take a crack at explicating what I think are some of the deeper divisions at play here.

First off: I am a Sanders supporter. I have given him money multiple times and voted for him in the Virginia primary. Second, I am not a registered Democrat (Virginia has open primaries). Third, and no doubt most controversially, if Clinton wins the nomination, I am not sure whether I will support her. I say this simply to offer full disclosure; I am not purporting to represent the party, or its base, or anyone else. I would like to present my reasons not only for supporting Sanders but also for considering not supporting the Democrats if he does not get the nomination.

If you are a Clinton-supporter and you are gasping for breath out of consternation, I ask that you take a second, catch your breath, and just hear me out. I’m not demanding that you agree with me! But I’d like you to understand my position. And if you are a fellow Sanders-nista and you are grinning smugly, I ask you to put a serious face on and consider whether the reasons I offer are the ones you would too–because Clinton-supporters feel strongly about their support for her and we should take them and their reasoning seriously. I’d like to try to step away from the emotions of candidate loyalty, and the way in which we like to perform our identities in public by showcasing that loyalty, for a second and think more structurally. Without further ado:

First off, it should be admitted that supporters of each candidate are ideologically and culturally diverse. Clinton supporters no doubt cover a wide range of people with a wide range of motivations: there are no doubt moderates who are supporting her because she seems the most practical candidate of either party, women (and men) who support her simply because she is the first woman to have a real chance at becoming president (not an insignificant or silly reason to support her, I should add); there are those committed cultural liberals anxious to have any Democrat in office to shore up the gains of the past 8 years, as well as progressives (this term annoys me in its vagueness, but I don’t have another good word to use here) who trust that she will really push a left-leaning set of policies forward.

For now, though, I’d like to address only those Clinton-supporters who consider themselves “leftist” or “progressive”, of some stripe or another. For the purposes of this discussion, I am going to define this group as having specific hopes on the following three policy areas. I want to stress that I am defining this group as people who want these things, whether or not they think they can realistically be achieved in the near-term:

  1. Guaranteed access to necessary healthcare for all people living in the US.
  2. Real reversal of income and wealth inequality, especially noting the need to address inequality of wealth between whites and people of color.
  3. Decreased rates of incarceration, especially of people of color.

If you do not hold these as political goals, you will probably find the rest of this post unhelpful in articulating your own political calculus. I am very much intending to speak to people with whom I share basic political, social, and moral positions. My argument is really intra-progressive or intra-leftist–I want to make a case for supporting Sanders and perhaps even withholding support from Clinton only to those who share these (and other) left-leaning goals. It seems clear to me that if these issues do not motivate you, you were never going to support Sanders in the first place and will not find my reasoning convincing. But I know that there are many Clinton supporters who do care about these issues, and I intend to address them here. I would also like to point out that I have kept foreign affairs and military issues off the table for now (even though I think that such issues provide perhaps some of the strongest arguments against Clinton, from the standpoint of my own values) because I want to present a simple and straightforward argument about electoral tactics and strategy, not debates over specific policy–again, just to be painfully clear, I am assuming we agree on our broad policy goals here. (If you don’t share these goals, we obviously could and perhaps should have that conversation, but I won’t pretend to address it here.)

OK, with all of that said, why do I think support for Sanders is important and support for Clinton, if she wins the nomination, may not be advisable? It seems to me that when it comes down to progressives (and again this word strikes me as problematic, but it covers a range of people that I think no other word currently does), the Clinton/Sanders divide cashes out in this way: Clinton supporters argue that we must support whichever Democrat is nominated or risk seeing recent victories (e.g. gay marriage) challenged and perhaps rolled-back by a Republican president. Meanwhile, Sanders supporters tend to stress that whatever her merits, Clinton’s policies and her legislative and executive history suggests that she is only marginally better than most Republicans on most issues, and therefore supporting her is not defensible or wise.

It’s important to point out here that both groups could be right: it both a) seems that Clinton really would hold the line on recent liberal victories and b) that ultimately her track record suggests that she is at best a very moderate liberal. (And again, for many of her supporters, this may be a virtue and not a deficiency, but I am assuming, as stated above, that my interlocutors here seek substantial policy change–debates over the need or lack of need for such change being bracketed for now). Assuming such agreement, the argument that most Clinton-supporting progressives seem to make is that we need to back incremental change, that backing a more radical candidate is a recipe for losing the election and giving power to those who want to roll back the meager progress we have managed to achieve.

And it has to be admitted that this makes perfect sense, at least at first blush. So why am I questioning this logic? I think we need to pay attention to the assumptions that go into this reasoning. Most of all, the emphasis is on the short-term: the goal for electoral action here is to cement gains made in the last 2-4 years, and all decisions about whom to support are, it seems to me, made from within this framework. So far as that premise is accepted, then support for Clinton seems obvious.

But if we question this premise, and suggest that we take a longer-term frame of reference, a troubling trend appears. If we ask not just about the last 2-4 years, but the last 20-40, the strategy of always supporting incremental change starts to look rather less than robust. Though victories, especially on so-called “culture war” issues (like gay marriage) have occurred, on most other fronts, progressive and leftist goals have been disappointed either partially or fully. Income inequality is rising, there has been little real action on global warming, incarceration rates have not fallen, undocumented immigrants are being detained and deported without any meaningful reform, etc. etc. Even some of the victories seem hollow: both the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act fall far short of what progressives believe was necessary (single-payer and reinstatement of Glass-Steagall, respectively). Meanwhile, policies, legislation, and treaties such as NAFTA have not been challenged, and indeed no mainstream Democrat seems to even admit in public that such a thing needs to be challenged.

Comparing this to the more-or-less broad consensus among Democrats from the 30s through the late 60s on a range of issues, especially regarding labor, economic, and fiscal policy, one wonders what happened. Why is that we went from having strong unions, high tax rates, and major landmark achievements (Social Security, Medicare/aid, the Civil Rights Act, etc.) to seeing much of that progress slowly erode for 40 years? (I want to be clear here about not romanticizing this period: especially on sex- and racial-equality, even the “best” Democrats of this era fell far short of what was needed. But the shift in the trajectory of the party’s priorities seems clear nonetheless.)

Obviously, any discussion of the causality of such a complex set of of events would itself be (endlessly) complex. But if we limit ourselves to the discussion of electoral behavior, one thing becomes clear. Since the late 70s, the Democratic Party seems to have shifted slightly rightward in just about every electoral cycle. Tax rates have fallen, incarceration rates have risen, income inequality has worsened, consistently and continually, even with Democrats in the White House and with Democratic majorities in Congress. Let’s not forget that it was under Bill Clinton that NAFTA, welfare reform, and harsher federal sentencing guidelines were passed.

In other words, support for Democrats has not resulted in slow progress, but seems rather to be aimed only at slowly the regress, rather than building power to achieve real gains for equality and justice–even at at time when majorities, even super-majorities, of Americans support the basic planks of progressive/leftist politics, according to a range of polls.

Again, remaining focused on electoral behavior, one conclusion seems to recommend itself: the Democratic Party is not worried about courting the progressive/leftist vote, as demonstrated clearly by the fact that they have continually supported the very opposite of the policies that this bloc has called for, at least on certain issues. If this is the case, the question that arises for those of us in that bloc is: what should be done about this lack of representation?

And here’s the essential point, as I see it: so long as the Democratic Party knows that progressives will support them, regardless of whether the Party actually delivers on any progressive goals, they have no incentive to so deliver. Meanwhile, a large number of moderate votes are up for grabs each cycle; by moving slightly right-ward in each election, the Party can capture some of these voters, helping to secure victory–and so long as they believe they gain more votes in the center by doing this than they will lose on the Left, this makes mathematical sense.

The only way to conceivably change this outcome is to discipline ourselves to think in the long-term; so long as our fear of the current Republican candidate pushes us to support the candidate with a [D] next to their name, regardless of their actual positions on any issues outside of those over which Republicans and Democrats like to disagree with each other over, we should expect the Party to move to the right, slowly but surely, over the course of election cycles. In short: this situation is explained by evolutionary logic, not by individual wills and deeply-held beliefs. So long as this institution recognizes that it has more to gain in terms of power in the executive, legislative, and judiciary by moving to the right, it will. Arguments about what is just and equal, morally right and wise, will fall on deaf ears because this institution, like every institution, is structured to maximize its security, power, and prestige. I want to be clear here that I am not accusing the Democratic Party of being some kind of nefarious conspiracy; I am saying that it is precisely as mundanely, boringly, and infuriatingly self-interested as every other human institution.

Those of us, then, who want to see progressive/leftist policies actually enacted need to figure out how to reverse this movement of the Party. Now, to the extent that we thought there was only a tiny percentage of Americans who supported our positions, the course of action would be obvious: we would need to do the work of spreading our ideas, convincing people of the need to enact the policies we see as necessary. An while this kind of organizing is, of course, still laudable, the thing is, this really isn’t the problem. Huge percentages of people already agree with us–in many cases, as mentioned above, absolute majorities!

If this is so, then we need to recognize that a different course of action is required. The problem isn’t that most voters don’t agree with us (obviously the specific degree of agreement on each issue varies, but broadly speaking, on the three issues I stipulated above, there is broad consensus) but that, despite most Americans wanting substantial change, that change isn’t happening–whether a Republican or  a Democrat is in office.

Recognizing this is, I think, the crucial move. If the electoral system is itself completely faulty–if its obvious that, in fact, the wishes of the majority on a range of issues are not being represented by elected officials–then hope in incremental change starts to look Quixotic. Such incremental change follows the structure of the system, so if we recognize that what is faulty is that very structure, then why would we think we can achieve our goals by yoking them to the thing that has been designed to frustrate them?

This is not to deny, of course, that, all other things being considered equal, small and incremental progress is still a good thing. It obviously is. But the reality is that all other things are not equal! If we are going to address the most pressing issues of our time–massive poverty, horrendous labor conditions, global warming, collapsing ecosystems–we are going to have to achieve orders of magnitude greater change than we have seen in the last few decades. And once we see that the progressive/leftist behavior of supporting the Democrats no matter what, in fear of the looming Republican menace, has itself helped to generate a more right-wing Democratic Party, then we have to have the courage to try and behave in new ways, to force that party to change its behavior.

In short: refusing to support the Democratic Party in elections until they agree to support some basic list of fundamental and essential policy changes, if only everyone who agreed with those changes (again, this is a huge percentage of the population!) acted in concert, could effect change in the Party in just one or two election cycles. It would, it is true, mean allowing, in the short-term, even worse candidates to get into office. But, if the basic narrative I’ve outlined above is more or less accurate–if the Democratic Party is shifting more and more to the right on the majority of issues–then voting for Democrats to keep Republicans out of office is the very behavior slowly transforming those Democrats into Republicans.

So the real tension here is between a tactical and a strategic decision-making process. Those who feel called to support Democrats no matter what are responding to the more immediate, on-the-ground tactical realities. And this makes sense, from within the framework of the assumptions it employs. Meanwhile, those who are increasingly convinced that the Democrats cannot be supported unless they commit to–and really act to achieve–important policy goals are, implicitly or explicitly, responding to a broader or strategic set of ideas, interests, and anxieties. The point here is not that one is better than the other, as if political decisions could be made purely at the particular or the general level. In fact, of course, competent decision-making requires both. But what the latter , strategic-focused group has begun to realize is that, in the particular circumstances that we face today, the tactical decision-making process is winning battles even as the war is being decisively lost.

What we need is a party that will actually represent the interests of working people, fight for environmental stability, call for racial justice, etc. The Democratic Party has never been truly committed to these goals (it has been especially inconsistent, to put it very mildly, on race) but, for about 40 years in the middle of this century, it seemed to be moving in the right (er–“correct”) direction. But in the past 40 years, we’ve seen it shift in the opposite one. What I, as a Sanders-supporter, am saying is that we need to be thinking about how to shape the Democratic Party to actually represent our interests, rather than allowing our fear of the Republicans to motivate us to loyally support the Democrats even as they transform themselves into precisely what we fear.

Unless, I think, we can talk about the tensions between these two levels of political decision-making–the tactical and the strategic–then I don’t think Clinton- and Sanders-supporters are likely to be really able to talk to and with each other. Some times and problems will call for a more tactical engagement, while others will call for a strategic vision. I think we are currently facing the latter, and unless we can act to change the Democratic Party’s behavior and the trajectory of its development, we will keep winning small (though undoubtedly important!) battles right up until the war is lost.

Withholding support from the Democrats is a risk, undoubtedly. And supporting them regardless of their actual commitments and actions has, in contrast, a guaranteed outcome–I just don’t think that outcome, at least in the long-term, is the one we actually want.